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of professional ethics as well as his own promise given under oath to
reimburse his client" as an aggravating factor. 65 It then cited the case
of The Florida Bar v. Winn,6 6 in which the court had suspended an
attorney for 6 months "[o]n facts scarcely more aggravating than
those presented here. ' '6 7 Although Moriber had practiced in Florida
since 1953 with "no prior disciplinary punishments," 68 it is clear that
the court considered Moriber's unrepentant attitude a severely aggravating factor which weighed in its decision to suspend him from
the practice of law for 45 days, his reinstatement conditioned upon
restitution of the excessive portion of the fee.
In Moriber, the Supreme Court of Florida, although censuring an
attorney for clearly excessive fees, indicated an unwillingness to relinquish the old standards of judging fees to be excessive, and will probably continue to punish only those who charge fees which "shock the
conscience" of the court.
CAROL ANN TURNER

Constitutional Law-DUE PROCESS-GEORGIA PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT PROCEDURES INVALID.-North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem,

Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
On August 20, 1973, plaintiff Di-Chem, Inc. filed suit in the superior
court of Whitfield County, Georgia, alleging that defendant North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. owed it $51,279.17 for goods sold and delivered.
Simultaneously, Di-Chem filed affidavit and bond for process of garnishment,1 asserting that it had "reason to apprehend the loss of said sum
65. 314 So. 2d at 149. The fact that Moriber knew at the time the contract was
executed that Pietz was the sole beneficiary of approximately $20,000 in trust funds was
specifically noted by the court. Id. at 146.
66.

208 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1968).

67. The facts which the court considered "scarcely more aggravating" are set out in
note 52 supra.
68. 314 So. 2d at 148.
1.

The procedural prerequisites to obtaining a writ of garnishment in Georgia are

governed by GA. CODE ANN. § 46 (1974); the statute provides exemptions for wages. GA.
CODE ANN.
§ 46-101 (1974). It requires that the plaintiff sign an affidavit before some
officer authorized to issue an attachment or the clerk of any record court, stating the
amount claimed due, the apprehension of loss of all or part of the amount claimed

due, and postage of a double bond. GA. CODE ANN, § 46-102 (1974). The affidavit may be
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or some part thereof unless process of Garnishment issues. ' ' 2 The court
clerk immediately issued a summons garnisheeing North Georgia's
corporate bank account at the First National Bank of Dalton. Three
days later North Georgia gave bond to dissolve the garnishment and
moved to dismiss the summons as being issued pursuant to a statute
that violated the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court overruled the motion, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Georgia sustained the statute." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 and reversed,5 holding that the Georgia
statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
by failing to provide for pregarnishment notice and hearing, or "other
safeguard against mistaken repossession." 6
The Supreme Court's present 7 interest in the due process ramifications of creditor's prejudgment remedies began in 1969 with Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp." There a Wisconsin garnishment statute was
held violative of the procedural due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment when applied to wage earners because the
statute permitted wage garnishment without prior notice and hearing.
The Court stated: "A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for
attachments in general . . .does not necessarily satisfy procedural due

process in every case.... We deal here with wages-a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system."" The
sworn to by an "agent or attorney at law of the plaintiff . . . to the best of his
knowledge and belief." GA. CODE ANN. § 46-103 (1974). The code requires the official to
issue the summons to the garnishee only upon the fulfilling of the conditions of the
code. It further requires the garnishee to give an inventory of the defendant's property
which it holds. An attachment is then made upon such property. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-105
(1974). Finally, dissolution of the garnishment may be accompanied by the defendant's
giving bond in the amount due with good security to the clerk or other officer who
issued the summons. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-401 (1974).
2. Affidavit of Di-Chem signed by R.L. Foster, its president, and Dual Broadrick,
clerk of the superior court of Whitfield County, dated August 20, 1971, North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 604 n.2. (1975).
3. The appeal from the trial court had originally been transferred to the court
of appeals, which affirmed the trial court, 194 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972). The
Georgia Supreme Court decided that its original transfer had been in error, 198 S.E.2d
284 (Ga. 1973), and removed jurisdiction of the case from the appellate court. The
Georgia Supreme Court then affirmed the trial court's decision, 201 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1973).
4. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
5. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
6. Id. at 606.
7. Earlier cases involving the necessity for notice and hearing prior to a deprivation of property, as opposed to personal rights and liberties, held that due process
requirements were met if notice and hearing were given before the final deprivation of
the property. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 & n.10 (1974).
8. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
9. Id. at 340.
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Court, however, seemed to imply a limited exception to its holding,
noting that summary procedures "may well meet the requirements of
due process in extraordinary situations."' 1 The Wisconsin statute failed
since it was not "narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition.""
Three years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 12 the Court extended the
Sniadach rationale to consumer goods, 1 holding Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes unconstitutional. The Fuentes Court asserted
that Sniadach principles were not limited to cases dealing with wages,
but "were in the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to
do with the absolute 'necessities' of life but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of
property takes effect."' 14 The Fuentes court clarified the limitation hinted at in Sniadach by discussing some of the "extraordinary situations"
in which a preseizure hearing is not required. Basically they are situations in which immediate government action is needed to protect a
public interest.' 5 Examples given by the Court included cases involving
a national war effort,'16 bank failure,' 7 misbranded drugs,

food.19

8

and spoiled

The Court also suggested, however, that carefully supervised
summary seizures might be permissible if a showing was made of imminent danger that a debtor will "destroy or conceal disputed goods. ' ' 2

The latter example suggested the Court's concern with the interests
of private creditors.
Nevertheless, Fuentes led several commentators to conclude that
a private creditor's needs could never justify prejudgment garnishment
absent notice and hearing. 1 Such conclusions were proven premature
in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 2 2 There the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice White, upheld a Louisiana sequestration provision that permitted the holder of a vendor's lien on property to seize that property
10. Id. at 339.
11. Id.
12. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
13. Id. at 88.
14. 395 U.S. at 339.
15. 407 U.S. at 90-92.
16. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239
(1921; Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
17. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
18. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
19. North Am. Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). See also Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (forfeiture of vessel carrying contraband drugs).
20. 407 U.S. at 93.
21. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41, 77-78 n.42 (1974).
But see Note, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell: A Confusing Trilogy and Utah Prejudgment Remedies, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 536, 541,
22. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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without prior notice to the debtor. To obtain a sequestration writ, a
Louisiana claimant had to allege an affirmative probability of destruction or concealment of the property in question; conclusory allegations
would not suffice. 23 The creditor also had to verify his fear of loss and
file a bond sufficient to make the debtor whole.2 4 Finally, the debtor
was entitled to a prompt hearing to seek dissolution of the writ.25 Alternatively, the debtor could regain possession of the property by filing
2
his own bond.

6

In analyzing the constitutionality of these procedures, the Mitchell
majority rejected the contention that Sniadach and Fuentes stood for
the proposition that notice and opportunity to be heard must precede
any deprivation of a property interest. According to the Mitchell majority, those cases "merely stand for the proposition that a hearing
must be had before one is finally deprived of his property ....'27 The
Court suggested that the Sniadach result turned on the sensitivity of
the property at issue, the risk that the Sniadach garnishment procedures would be abused by creditors, the fact that providing notice
and hearing prior to garnishment posed no special risk to creditors,
and the fact that the Sniadach Court had not considered how quickly
the debtor could challenge wage garnishment. 2 The Court further

stated that Sniadach, unlike Mitchell, had not involved property in
which the creditor had an interest prior to a suit on the debt. Though
that situation had been presented in Fuentes, the Mitchell Court
stated that the Fuentes result turned on the fact that goods could be
replevied without either notice and hearing or judicial supervision of
summary procedures. 29 The Court found that the Louisiana sequestration question involved a "factual and legal background sufficiently
different ' '3 0 from Fuentes to pass constitutional muster and that the
Louisiana law "minimize[d] the risk of error of a wrongful interim
possession by the creditor." 31 The Court found the law to be a constitutionally acceptable accommodation of debtor and creditor interests.2
In reaching these conclusions, the Court considered such factors as
whether a judge or court clerk issued the writ,2 the showing required
23. Id. at 605.
24. Id. at 605-06.
25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 607.

27.

416 U.S. at 611 (emphasis added).

28.
29.

Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.

30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 618. See id. at 616-17, n.12.

32.
33.

Id. at 607. See id. at 618.
Id. at 616.
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by the applicant of possible damage to the goods,3'4 whether there
would eventually be an opportunity for the debtor to reply,3 5 and when
this opportunity would occur.3 6
Four members of the Mitchell Court read Fuentes as requiring that
notice and hearing be provided prior to any seizure of property, and
concluded that Mitchell had overruled Fuentes.3 7 A fifth Justice stated
simply that Fuentes required reversal of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
judgment.38 In this milieu the Court was faced with Di-Chem. Speaking
for the Court, Mr. Justice White found the case controlled by
Fuentes and Mitchell 9 Though he relied on Fuentes, Justice White
read that case as narrowly as he had in Mitchell. He interpreted Fuentes
as requiring notice and opportunity for a hearing "or other safeguard
against mistaken repossession" before a prejudgment seizure. 40 Because
the Georgia statute permitted prejudgment seizures initiated by a
"writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or
opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a judicial officer, ' ' 4 1 Justice White held it unconstitutional under Fuentes.
He further found that the statute did not fall within the Mitchell
rule. Justice White noted that the Georgia statute at issue in Di-Chem
permitted issuance of the writ by a court clerk on the conclusory
affidavit of the creditor or his attorney. In contrast, the Louisiana writ
in Mitchell was issuable only by a judge who had examined affidavits
that set out the specific facts necessitating sequestration. 42 Additionally, the Georgia statute, unlike the Louisiana statute, failed to provide
an opportunity for an early hearing at which the creditor would bear
the burden of showing probable cause for the garnishment.1s Justice
White also rejected arguments that Fuentes and Mitchell should be
34. Id. at 616. Cf. id. at 608 (where buyer holds property after payments stop, his
use of the property produces deterioration that impairs seller's security).
35. Id. at 618.
36.

Id.

37. Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 630-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined
by Douglas, J., and Marshall, J.).
38. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J.).
39. 419 U.S. at 605-08.
40. Id. at 606. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615 (1974): "Because
carried out without notice or opportunity for hearing and without judicial participation,
[the Fuentes] seizure was held violative of the Due Process Clause." Justice White's reading of Fuentes was obviously selective. In Di-Chem, he quoted language from Fuentes
which implied that even a short-term deprivation of property is subject to the Due Process Clause. 419 U.S. at 606, quoting 407 U.S. at 86. But he chose to ignore the sentence
that followed the quoted language-a sentence indicating that any such deprivation
must be preceded by notice and hearing.
41. 419 U.S. at 606.
42. Id. at 607. This procedure was in force only within Orleans Parish (the area
in which the Mitchell suit arose). The Court declined to rule on the validity of statutorily authorized clerk-issued writs outside of Orleans Parish. 416 U.S. at 606 n.5.
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confined to seizures of consumer goods and not extended to corporate
assets. Citing Fuentes, and making tangential reference to Sniadach,4
he asserted that the Court would not draw distinctions among different
45
types of property in applying the due process clause.
Though the concurrences and dissents in Di-Chem bickered over
the "resuscitation" of Fuentes,4 6 it seems clear that the Fuentes assumption that notice and opportunity to be heard must precede any property
deprivation has not been revitalized. After Di-Chem, Fuentes apparently stands only for the proposition that prejudgment seizure procedures
must provide adequate safeguards against wrongful, though temporary,
deprivations. Di-Chem further indicates that the Mitchell safeguards
would be adequate even though a creditor had no prior property
interest-such as a vendor's lien-in the property to be seized. Thus
the central question raised by Di-Chem is what procedures, other than
prior notice and hearing, constitute adequate safeguards against mistaken deprivations.
Justice White apparently regards judicial supervision of summary
seizure procedures as a central factor in determining the adequacy
of safeguards.47 But the Mitchell and Di-Chem emphasis on judicial
issuance of sequestration and garnishment writs is unlikely to prove
dispositive. Six Justices have now asserted that the fact that a writ is
issued by a judge rather than a clerk is of no constitutional significance.41
Justice White's ability to force the divergent Mitchell and Di-Chem
majorities to accept his stress on the clerk-judge distinction indicates
that the Supreme Court's treatment of creditors' prejudgment
remedies can be best explained by examining the voting pattern of
the Court. The various opinions of the Justices in Sniadach, Fuentes,
Mitchell, and Di-Chem demonstrate little more than the depth of their
disagreement. Except for Sniadach, which seems the only "untouchable"
among the cases, the decisional history resolves itself into a shifting of
two voting blocks around Justice White.
One block, led by Justice Stewart,49 first coalesced in Fuentes. Until
43. 419 U.S. at 607.
44. Id. at 608.
45. Id.
46. Compare 419 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring) with 419 U.S. at 609 (Powell,
J., concurring in the judgment) and 419 U.S. at 614-20 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
47. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
48. North Georgia Finishing, Inc., v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 611 n.3 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, J.); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 632-33 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ.).
49. Justices Stewart, Marshall, Brennan and Douglas voted together consistently
in Fuentes, Mitchell, and Di-Chern, comprising the majority in Fuentes (a 4-3 decision),
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Di-Chem, it adhered to the proposition that whenever the state seizes a
debtor's property at a creditor's behest, the debtor must be given notice
and opportunity to be heard before any deprivation occurs. The other
block, consisting of the Nixon appointees, has generally 50 maintained
that the due process clause is satisfied if notice and hearing are provided at some time before the deprivation becomes final."l Justice
White, by contrast, has applied a balancing test that led him to vote
with the Stewart block in Di-Chem, and the Nixon appointees in
Mitchell. Though there are no indications that other Justices have accepted that test, it offers both a means of rationalizing Sniadach,
Fuentes, Di-Chem, and Mitchell, and a tool for providing some pre-

dictability in this area.
Justice White first enunciated a balancing approach to prejudgment taking in Fuentes. There, in dissent, 52 he compared the buyer's
interest in continuing use of the property with the seller's interest in
preserving his property:
[A probable cause hearing's] stated purpose is "to prevent unfair
and mistaken deprivations of property." But in these typical situations, the buyer-debtor has either defaulted or he has not. If there
the dissenting minority in Mitchell, and joining with Justice White to create the majority
in Di-Chem. For examples of each Justice's position, see the opinions of Justice Stewart in
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 67, and Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 629; Justice Brennan in Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S. 664 (1974); Justice Marshall in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 206 (1974). Justice Douglas, while not articulating an opinion in full, concurred
with each of the preceding opinions.
50. Justice Powell has been somewhat more reluctant to follow Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger; see, e.g., his concurring opinion in Di-Chemn. 419 U.S.
at 609-14. While he is concerned that special provisions for a review by a neutral (not a
judicial) officer and for a prompt post seizure hearing be made at which at least a
probable cause showing be required of the claimant, id. at 609, he appears to agree
with his brethren in dissent that, given the above, the Georgia statute would have
been sufficient in the commercial setting of Di-Chem. 419 U.S. at 612 n.5.
51. The gravamen of Justice Blackmun's dissent in Di-Chem, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, and in relevant part by Chief Justice Burger, id. at 619-20, is that the protections required by the due process clause are flexible. Absent a showing of compelling
public policy, notice and hearing at some time prior to final deprivation satisfies the
due process clause. In the commercial world described in Di-Chem no more than minimum
(lue process requirements need be followed absent a showing of unconscionability on
the part of the claiming party. As examples of areas in which due process requirements
were "tailored" to the surrounding commercial milieu, he cited D. H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), and Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), in which
the Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, upheld confession of judgment clauses
given the arm's length nature of the transaction. For a further explanation of this idea
of "tailoring" due process requirements to the nature of the property involved, see Note,
Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest
Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
52. 407 U.S. at 97.
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is a default, it would seem not only "fair," but essential, that the
creditor be allowed to repossess; and I cannot say that the likelihood
of a mistaken claim of default is sufficiently real or recurring to
justify a broad constitutional requirement that a creditor do more
than the typical state law requires and permits him to do ...
[I]t would not seem in the creditor's interest for a default occasioning
repossession to occur; as a practical matter it would much better
serve his interests if the transaction goes forward and is completed
as planned .... Nor does it seem to me that creditors would lightly
undertake the expense of instituting replevin actions and putting up
bonds.5
Thus Justice White was unwilling to discount the creditor's rights in
property where the right to possession was disputed. He also suggested
that in a replevin action the debtor at least be required to make his
5
payments to the court pending resolution of the suit..
The full articulation of his balancing test is found in Arnett v.
Kennedy.5 5 Justice White's separate opinion53 in that case enunciated
a balancing test far more comprehensive than the somewhat cursory
treatment of the debtor-creditor issues in Fuentes. In Arnett, which involved due process protections against wrongful discharge of federal
employees, Justice White addressed the issue of whether a hearing must
be held "before any 'taking' of the .. .property interest . ..occurs,
5
even if a full hearing is available before that taking becomes final." 7
He acknowledged the constitutional requirement of notice and hearing
when a property right is taken from an individual58 He then outlined a
number of factors to be considered in determining when that hearing
should occur. Stating that the Court had usually held that a hearing
at some time before permanent deprivation would suffice, 59 Justice
White recognized that the Court had also held that such a hearing must,
on occasion, be held before any deprivation occurs. 60 In determining
whether or not a predeprivation hearing was necessary, Justice White
asserted that the Court had looked to the effect of prior notice and

53, Id. at 100-01.
54. Id. at 102.
55. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
56. Id. at 171 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 186.
58. Id. at 178.
59. Id. at 187, citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
These cases were also among those cited for the traditional rule in Mitchell. See
note 7 supra.
60. 416 U.S. at 187.
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hearing on the competing interests of the parties. 6' He stated that predeprivation hearings could generally be dispensed with where the "interest of the party opposing the hearing might be defeated outright if
such hearing were to be held, ' ' 62 (as where the party in possession may
alienate or destroy the property 3), the party opposing the hearing
"stands ready to make whole the party who has been deprived of his
property, if the initial taking proves to be wrongful. ' ' 6 4 He stressed,
however, that in such situations summary procedures were permissible
only if authorized by a public official or judge. Such official authorization, Justice White indicated, is crucial because it minimizes the
possibility of mistaken deprivation. 5
Justice White then examined cases in which a predeprivation hearing had been required. In general, those cases involved situations in
which wrongful, though temporary, deprivation might produce severe
injury even though normally acceptable procedures were followed. He
concluded that four factors are to be weighed in determining whether a
predeprivation hearing is necessary: the risk of wrongful deprivation;
the impact on the property holder of having to give up his property
pending a hearing (a matter evaluated by examining the type of
property at issue and the length of time between the summary seizure
and the postseizure hearing); the need for the creditor-claimant to
avoid alerting the property holder to the pending lawsuit; and the
risk of leaving the property in the hands of the current possessor
6
during the period between the notice and hearing.
Justice White apparently applied these criteria in Mitchell in upholding the Louisiana sequestration statute. After determining that
67
the risk of destruction or dissipation of the vendor's lien was real,
he reasoned that the procedural protections were sufficient to protect
the vendee from wrongful deprivation." Since this was not a case involving a "necessity of life," as was Sniadach, the loss to the vendee was
insufficient for the court to go beyond the "normal" requirement of a
6
hearing at some time prior to final deprivation. 9
In Di-Chem Justice White was faced with a statute which lacked
the procedural protections-most notably judicial supervision of the

61.

Id. at 188.

62.

Id.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 190.
416 U.S. at 608-09.
Id. at 608-10.
Id. at 611, 618-19.
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summary procedures-mandated by his test in Arnett and Mitchell.
There was thus no need to balance the creditor's interest in preserving
his property from possible dissipation against any overriding need of
the debtor to protect his corporate bank account. Nonetheless, some
language in Di-Chem indicates the underlying rationale of Justice
White's balancing test. He stated that "[a]lthough the length or severity
of a deprivation of use or possession would be another factor to weigh
in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it was not deemed to
be determinative of the right to a hearing of some sort."7 0 Since Justice

White believes that the "normal" requirements of the due process
clause are met by a hearing at some time prior to final deprivation, it
follows that, given sufficient procedural safeguards and absent an
overriding need of the debtor (as in Sniadach, where wages were at
issue), a predeprivation hearing is not constitutionally required.
In Justice White's view, it thus appears that to meet constitutional
requirements in the usual summary case, a meaningful hearing must
be provided prior to the final taking, 71 summary seizure procedures must
incorporate safeguards-e.g., judicial supervision-against wrongful deprivation, 72 and the creditor must stand ready to make the debtor whole
should his suit be fruitless.7 Under Justice White's theory it would
be incumbent upon those asserting a need for predeprivation hearings
to show extraordinary circumstances to justify a departure from the
preceding requirements. In this sense it would appear that if Justice
White's views are accepted by a majority of the Court, a broad reading
of Fuentes is "dead."
Whether or not Justice White's balancing test will be accepted is
an open question. Though a considerable majority of the Court has, in
Mitchell and Di-Chem, aligned itself with the result of his rationale,
no member of the Court has voiced agreement with the rationale itself.
70. 419 U.S. at 606.
71. See text accompanying notes 58, 59 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 6, 65 supra. It was the lack of procedural safeguards
(supervision by a judicial officer, fair notice to the debtor, and issuance of the writ
upon unsworn motion by the creditor) that led Judge Krentzman to find the Florida
prejudgment garnishment statute, FLA. STAT. § 77.031 (1975), deficient under Di-Chem.
Bunton v. First National Bank, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Fla. 1975). Bunton misreads
Di-Chern in that the district court considered unimportant Florida's provision for a
prompt post garnishment hearing. 394 F. Supp. at 795. Since this is one of the three
prongs of Justice White's "normal" due process criteria (the others being judicial supervision and a readiness to make the debtor whole) it would appear that had the Florida
statute provided for judicial supervision, it would have passed constitutional muster
under Di-Chem. The Bunton court's emphasis on no notice to the debtor prior to
issuance of the writ is a misreading of Di-Chem and Mitchell; these cases allow such
an action given a bond, judicial supervision and a prompt post seizure hearing.
73. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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Justice White's theory does, however, offer a rational approach to
prejudgment creditors' remedies and a means to arrive at a loose
reconciliation of Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and Di-Chem. Adoption
of that theory would thus make it far easier to evaluate the constitutionality of various creditors' remedies. A majority of the Court might
balk at equating "adequate safeguards" with judicial supervision of

summary procedures, but the remaining elements of Justice White's
test-as yet unarticulated in a prejudgment remedies case-may ultimately become law. It is at least clear that so long as Justice White holds
a key vote in prejudgment seizure cases, legislators and lawyers who
ignore the rationale propounded in Arnett risk adverse decisions in the
United States Supreme Court.
JOHN JEFFERSON RIMES III

Constitutional

Law-VAGRANCY-FLORIDA'S

LOITERING STATUTE UPHELD

To

PROHIBIT LOITERING WHICH

AS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN CONSTRUED

THREATENS PUBLIC SAFETY OR A BREACH OF THE PEACE.-State

v. Ecker,

311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975).
In February 1975, four consolidated cases from Dade County1
tested for the first time the constitutionality of Florida's loitering
statute. 2 The various defendants were arrested for loitering or prowlState v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1975).
FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1975), provides:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in
a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant
a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons
or property in the vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether
such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes
flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself, or
manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the person
1.
2.

or other circumstances makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior
to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to
dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by
requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct.
No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section if the law
enforcement officer did not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial

